One of the most frequently repeated claims about the DPRK is that its leadership is “starving people” and they're experiencing nationwide famine conditions. These claims are often accompanied by the assertion that the DPRK rejected international aid and support during the Arduous March of the 1990s. The Arduous March is also frequently presented as evidence of the inherent failures of socialist systems.
The goal of this article is to investigate these claims and examine the historical conditions that shaped the Arduous March, as well as the present-day situation in the DPRK.
The Arduous March: What Was It & What Caused It?
The Arduous March is the name given to a period of famine and economic setbacks that occurred in the DPRK between 1994 and 1999. The famine was caused by a complex interaction of factors, including the collapse of the USSR and Eastern bloc trading partners, natural disasters, sanctions, and the geographical conditions of the DPRK.
To begin, over 80% of the DPRK’s land is mountainous, leaving only approximately 14% of the country’s land arable and suitable for farming.¹ It should also be noted that the DPRK has a relatively short growing season due to its cold climate. Because of these conditions, the DPRK heavily relied on the USSR for trade, particularly for food and oil. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the DPRK lost its largest trading partner and support system.
The 1990s also saw a multitude of natural disasters. In August of 1995, approximately 30% of the country was affected by devastating floods that caused enormous damage.² The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported unprecedented flooding throughout 1995–1996, followed by a drought and typhoon in 1997.³
These conditions destroyed infrastructure, created food and medicine shortages, depleted grain reserves, and caused the DPRK’s Gross Domestic Product to fall by 30%.⁴
If these conditions weren't already severe enough, the 1990s also saw an intensification of international sanctions on the DPRK, as well as a large reluctance on behalf of the United States to cooperate with the DPRK. As stated in research from the Peterson Institute for International Economics:⁵
The failure of the International Atomic Energy Agency, South Korea, and the United States to resolve the crisis in a timely manner and the tightening of sanctions against the country constituted an important background condition for the famine.
Considering these circumstances, it would be absurd to reduce the Arduous March to merely being a failure of socialism. Socialism can't control weather patterns or geography, nor was socialism responsible for sanctioning the DPRK. This isn't to say that the DPRK’s agricultural system was without flaws. However, prior to the 1990s, agriculture in the DPRK had been relatively successful, and the country maintained a fairly steady food supply.
Even a CIA assessment from 1978 showed that the DPRK experienced an average annual grain production increase of 5.4% between 1965 and 1978, while the per capita amount of grain available for consumption was equal to that of South Korea. The CIA itself considered the DPRK to be “nearly self-sufficient in grain supplies,” noting that its annual grain production growth far exceeded population growth.⁶
The food production index provided by the World Bank also demonstrates the DPRK’s agricultural growth from 1961 until its peak in 1991. Until 1991, food production had steadily increased.⁷
Did the DPRK Reject Aid During the Arduous March?
This claim is frequently raised in discussions about the DPRK’s food situation in general and the Arduous March in particular, but is there any truth to it? The short answer is no, there's no evidence supporting this claim and there's ample documentation to the contrary.
Earlier in this article, information was cited from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. This information comes from a United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which requested $415,648,979 in humanitarian assistance and 657,972 metric tons of food aid valued at $378.2 million.³
The DPRK reached out to multiple UN agencies, such as UNICEF and the World Food Programme, as well as various international NGOs, even allowing them to establish offices in Pyongyang to carry out humanitarian work.⁸
Far from “allowing the population to starve,” the DPRK actively sought cooperation with the international community and made repeated requests for aid and assistance.
With this in mind, we can now turn to an examination of the present-day food situation in the DPRK.
Food Insecurity Issues Are Real
Although progress has been made in this area, food insecurity remains a real problem in the DPRK. This issue is largely exacerbated by the DPRK being one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world.
According to Dr. Kee B. Park:⁹
They went from “smart” sanctions to “total” sanctions and started blocking the importation of fuel—an almost complete embargo...
It's not uncommon for people to downplay the impact of sanctions and fuel restrictions on the DPRK. However, fuel is essential for a functioning agricultural system. As Dr. Kee B. Park explains:
Also, consider farm machinery. How do you power farm machinery without fuel? When fuel imports are reduced this drastically—with only one-tenth of what formerly entered the country now coming in—there will inevitably be a rationing system and prioritization of how available fuel is used.
He further notes:
More than half of North Korean farmers are women. Women now farm by hand, because there’s no fuel for farming machinery and broken machinery can’t be repaired because sanctions prohibit the importation of necessary parts. So, women have to work harder to get the same yield, bearing a disproportionate burden.
If Americans are genuinely concerned with the physical quality of life of Koreans, then they should be advocating for an end to the sanctions regime that directly impacts the population. Accusing one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world of deliberately starving its people, just 73 years after it was subjected to a genocidal war of destruction, is not only historically ignorant, but is blatant victim-blaming.
This article doesn't deny the real food security issues that exist in the DPRK. However, if responsibility is to be assigned, it should be directed toward the countries enforcing the sanctions regime, not socialism, not the WPK, and not Kim Jong Un.
In fact, the WPK has made progress in stabilizing the situation since the 1990s. They haven't experienced nationwide famine conditions since the Arduous March, and indicators suggest a reduction in hunger.
Examining the Current Situation
Despite the persistent claims of nationwide famine conditions, available data and research suggest a significant reduction in hunger in the DPRK, particularly among vulnerable groups such as children.
According to Soo-Kyung Lee’s 2017 study North Korean Children: Nutrition and Growth:⁸
Acute malnutrition among North Korean children has improved, as evidenced by the downward trend in the prevalence of wasting and severe wasting. In 1998, the prevalence of global acute malnutrition (wasting) was 15.6%, which met the UN classification of a "very high" level necessitating immediate emergency responses, as shown in Table 3. However, the level of wasting has decreased to 4%, which meets the UN classification of “low” level. Therefore, acute malnutrition from severe food shortages might not be the current situation in North Korea.
The same study also notes a marked decline in chronic malnutrition in Children:
The trend for chronic malnutrition was similar to that for acute malnutrition (Fig. 2). In 1998, 2 out of 3 children (62.3%) were stunted; in 2012, less than 1 out of 3 children (27.9%) were stunted.
These trends indicate a sustained improvement in child nutrition and food security.
Similarly, Dr. Kee B. Park and Edward I. Ham’s 2021 study, North Korea’s Surprisingly Robust Healthcare System, highlights comparatively strong health outcomes relative to economic peers:¹⁰
North Korea’s key health indicators stand out when compared to its economic peers. In 2019, life expectancy in North Korea was estimated at 72.3 years and the under-5 child mortality rate was 17.3 deaths per 1,000 live births — versus an average across low-income countries of 63.7 years and 67.6 deaths respectively.
The steady increase in life expectancy and the reduction of under-5 mortality since the early 2000s is consistent with post-crisis recovery, rather than sustained and ongoing mass mortality conditions. Historically, severe famines are associated with a decline in life expectancy, but according to World Bank data, life expectancy in the DPRK has increased from approximately 61 years in 2002 to around 74 years in 2024.¹¹
Life expectancy alone can't measure food security conditions, but it does function as a broad indicator of overall population health trends over time.
When we view death from malnutrition per 100,000, the DPRK has a rate of 1.7 (2023). For comparison, France records 2.7, Norway 2.1, and the United States 2.8. Low-income countries average 7.5, while lower-middle-income countries average 4.5. Of course, these estimates shouldn't be treated as perfect measurements, but they don't support the image of the DPRK as an extreme global outlier in malnutrition-related mortality.
Conclusion
When this is all tied together, it is clear that despite existing issues, the DPRK has managed to reduce acute malnutrition among children from 15.6% in 1998 down to 4%, and chronic malnutrition from 62.3% down to 27.9%. This demonstrates a shift out of famine-level acute malnutrition conditions into non-emergency levels that are largely in line with other low-income countries.
When compared with its economic peers (the average for low-income countries), the DPRK has a life expectancy nearly 10 years higher (72.3 as of 2021), and an under-5 child mortality rate of 17.3 deaths per 1,000 live births, which is significantly lower. According to World Bank data, life expectancy has increased from approximately 61 years in 2002 to around 74 years in 2024.
The DPRK also records lower mortality from malnutrition than a large portion of lower-income and lower-middle-income countries, as well as some higher-income countries such as the United States, France, and Norway.
These indicators are not characteristic of a country experiencing a severe and sustained nationwide famine. They suggest that the DPRK faces the same challenges as many low-income countries, but performs comparatively well on several key health indicators. Yet these conditions are often selectively framed in Western discourse as evidence of human rights violations.
The evidence also indicates that the DPRK did request international assistance during the Arduous March, and the government didn't merely allow famine conditions to develop, nor did it deliberately cause mass starvation. Instead, the country has attempted to recover under extremely constrained conditions, including sanctions, covert operations, and ongoing regime change attempts by the West.
Any attempt to reduce the Arduous March or present-day food insecurity solely to the socialist system is reductive and incorrect. Although some internal conditions and mistakes played a role, external pressures such as sanctions, and geographical and environmental conditions have to be accounted for.
What's particularly notable is the way that economic warfare is often downplayed or ignored, while blame is directed specifically at the DPRK government. This is the modus operandi of imperialist countries: destabilize a place with sanctions, and when conditions get bad, place the blame on the government to try and foment regime change.
Food security issues exist. This is undeniable. However, the available evidence doesn't support the claim that the government intentionally starved people during the Arduous March or today.
References
⁴Ibid
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